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Groups, an action dictated by the Offsite Agreement of 1993. Ironically, one of these groups was oriented to Southwest Asia, the very theater that every U.S. Army Special Forces Group has deployed a considerable number of its members and will continue to do for years to come.
America had never expected to commit a substantial amount of its forces, let alone its unconventional forces, to a region for an extended period of time to combat terrorism. War was not envisioned that way.
Despite the demands placed on the United States Special Operations Command to focus on unconventional war as a basis to respond to the 21st Century threat". 13 Review trump Goldwater-Nichols in some fashion? In order to proceed we need to take a basic look at each of these policies in an attempt to determine the answers to these questions.
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
With its desire to create a more appropriate balance between joint and service interests as a backdrop, Congress declared eight purposes for the act:
• To reorganize DOD and strengthen civilian authority.
• To improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.
• To place clear responsibility on the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
• To ensure that the authority of commanders of unified and specified combatant commands is fully commensurate with the responsibility of those commanders for the accomplishment of missions assigned to those commands.
• To increase attention to strategy formulation and contingency planning.
• To provide for the more efficient use of defense resources.
• To improve joint officer management policies.
• Otherwise to enhance the effectiveness of military operations and improve DOD management and administration. 18 The main objective of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was to reinforce civilian authority over the military, increase unified and specified combatant command responsibility and authority and to create and foster a joint mindset and culture within the purpose of the eight purposes outlined above, Locher states "the act prescribed the chain of command as running from the President to the Secretary to the CINC (referring to the unified and specified combatant commanders)". 29 Locher further states "opinion is universal that this objective of Goldwater-Nichols has been achieved". In his review of Goldwater-Nichols with regard to the "commensurate authority" purpose,
Locher stated that:
Congress found the combatant commands to be weak and unified in name only.
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To correct this violation of command principles, Congress specified command authority to the CINCs. 33 The Goldwater-Nichols Act addressed the command functions of giving authoritative direction, prescribing the chain of command, organizing commands and forces, employing forces, assigning command functions to subordinate commanders, coordinating and approving aspects of administration and support, selecting and suspending subordinates, and convening courts-martial. 34 It is now widely agreed that Goldwater-Nichols has achieved its objective of balancing the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders. Component Special Operations will remain a cornerstone within the Special Operations community. One would hope that transformation does not lead to future decisions similar to the ones illustrated here. Whatever the future holds for the Special Operations community, USSOCOM will characteristically maintain it place as the premier unified combatant command.
As has always been the case prior to and since 11 September 2001, USSOCOM, USASOC, USASFC(A) and USACAPOC(A) will continue to answer the nation's call in the war on terrorism.
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